The vulnerability of most existing face recognition and authentication systems against face presentation attacks (a.k.a. face spoofing attacks) has been mentioned and studied in many works. This paper introduces a novel parametric approach for face PAD using a statistical model of image noise. In fact, facial images from a presentation attack contain specific textural information caused by the presentation process which makes them different from bona-fide images. The subtle difference between bona-fide and presentation attack images can be interpreted by the difference regarding noise statistics within the skin zone of the face. Our solution is casted in the hypothesis testing framework. A new database for face PAD containing face bona-fide images and images of high-quality presentation attacks has been also introduced. The performance of the proposed approach was proven in the mentioned database. Experimental results show that, in a controlled situation, our solution performs better than the other approaches in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication by facial recognition become actually an alternative or additional solution to reinforce the security of several information systems. However, facial recognition systems are proven to be vulnerable to presentation attack. In fact, an attacker can bypass the authentication process by presenting in front of the camera a copy version of the legitimate user's face image. Indeed, with the growth of the Internet and particularly of social networks, where many people don't mind to publish their personal information including their photographs, attackers can easily obtain photos of somebody's face and use them finally to attack their owner. Therefore, it is of vital importance to identify and reject presentation attacks in the facial recognition process.
Image noises are undesired variation in pixel intensity value, which non-uniformly corrupts the smooth surface in an image and degrades the image quality. These noises come from various sources during the acquisition process: lighting condition, imperfect instruments, photon conversion, compression, and transmission losses, etc. In this paper, they are referred as acquisition noise.
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Micro-textural information presents on the surface of objects captured in an image can also be interpreted as noise in the final output of the image acquisition process. In this paper, this noise is considered as textural noise. The nature of these textures is various. For example, they can be small bristles in a human face, the moiré pattern, or degradations caused by printing process in printed photos.
Acquisition noise values depend mainly on the acquisition process. Meanwhile, the nature of textural noise significantly relies on the scene captured in an image. It varies differently according to the nature of the scene, from a bona-fide face to a presentation attack one. In this work, it is proposed to study textural noise to build a new face presentation attack detector.
Estimated noise, which is a combination of the acquisition noise and the textural one, can be extracted from the initial image thanks to a denoising process. However, in practice, it is hard to eliminate acquisition noises to study the textural noises separately. To investigate the textural noise, it is proposed to consider the estimated noise while the acquisition noise is maintained statistically stable between the images. The statistical stability of acquisition noise can be expectively assured by holding unchanged acquisition conditions. VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PAPER
The significant contributions of the present work are:
• We introduce a recent stat-of-the-art of the face PAD problems.
• We introduce a statistical noise model for facial images, which can highlight the difference between bona-fide images and images taken from presentation attacks.
• The proposed noise model is then exploited by casting in the framework of hypothesis testing to construct a new face presentation attack detector.
• We introduce a new database, titled as DF-FPAD (Digital Forensic -Face Presentation Attack Detection), containing high quality images of high quality face presentation attacks, acquired in controlled conditions. Images from this new database contain more information than ones from the other available public databases, such as Replay-Attack Database [1] , CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [2] , and MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database [3] , NUAA Imposter Face Database [4] , where the images or videos are generally in low resolution, and the information about the acquisition conditions and the quality of attacks realization is not clear. In our study, lack of neccessary resources, the presentation attacks using masks are not considered. The work is reproducible. The proposed database 1 and the implementation 2 of the given solution are free to check out.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a state-of-the-art discussion on the recent advances in face presentation attack detection. It is introduced in Section III-A a noise statistical model applied for facial images. Section IV presents a face presentation attack detector using the framework of hypothesis testing. A description of the tested images dataset and experimental results are then given in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRIOR WORK
Face presentation attacks can be categorized into three types: Print-Attack, Replay-Attack and Mask-Attack. Print-Attack is the simplest one to be implemented. Attackers use just a single image of a legitimate user's face printed on paper or displayed on a screen to bypass the authentication system. For a Replay-Attack, attackers have in their hand a video capturing the legitimate user's face and use it displayed on a screen to authenticate. Mask-Attack is more sophisticated. Attackers have to collect enough information about the legitimate user's face to create a mask, which will be used to trick the system.
Existing approaches for face spoofing detection are quite numerous. Many ways for categorizing these approaches have been proposed in literature [5] - [7] .
A very first categorization, proposed by Chakka et al. [5] , divided existing solutions into three categories: motion, 1 DF-FPAD database: https://goo.gl/ptHhP5 2 MATLAB implementation: https://goo.gl/7sxxPs liveness and texture analyses. This categorization is ambiguous and does not help to identify the strength of each solution [6] . Furthermore, many recent approaches cannot be appropriately assigned by using this one.
Tirunagari et al. [6] proposed to classify a method as either data-driven or cue-based. While cue-based approaches rely on intuition and observations, data-driven ones tend to use image-processing algorithms to extract some texture descriptors and then use them as data to classify images.
Recently, Boulkenafet et al. [7] proposed a threepart categorization: hardware-based, challenge-response and software-based techniques.
In this work, based on the type of input data, a hierarchical categorization for face anti-spoofing solutions is proposed, as given in Figure 1 . A standard camera sensor is the basic source of information for most of the existing approaches, but alternative or additional information from other sensors can also be exploited in some approaches. Therefore, it is proposed to divide existing solutions into two principal categories: hardware-based and software-based approaches.
A. HARDWARE-BASED APPROACHES
Hardware-based solutions exploit information from non standard sensors to provide efficient means for face presentation attack detection, such as depth camera sensors [8] , stereo cameras [9] , [10] , near-infrared cameras [11] - [13] , thermal cameras [13] , [14] , light field cameras [15] , [16] and multispectral cameras [17] .
Movement information of the camera device, given by motion sensors, can also be compared with the ones estimated from a 3D reconstruction process [18] to detect presentation attacks. In a genuine authentication case, the two sources tend to describe the same information, which is not the case in a face presentation attack. The non-correlation between information given by the two sources can be used as a cue to reject a presentation attack.
Hardware-based approaches require the use of alternative or additional sensors, which implies the restriction of their application.
B. SOFTWARE-BASED APPROACHES
Software-based approaches exploit only information given by conventional camera sensor, no more sensors are required.
Basing on the quantity of information exploited, these approaches can be divided into two sub-categories: Dynamic approaches which require multiple images, and static ones where a single image is enough to take a decision.
1) DYNAMIC APPROACHES
Approaches from this subcategory tend to detect face liveness or some specific 3D properties of the scene based on some a priori assumptions. This information can be interpreted as some specific dynamics between successive images, which cannot be extracted from a single image. Dynamic approaches can be categorized into challenge-response or user-transparent.
A challenge-response approach requires user's cooperation. Authentication system will prompt a user for some specific random actions, such as changing face expressions [19] , [20] , changing head pose [21] - [23] , winking eyes [24] , moving the pupils [25] , [26] , or speaking some specific words [27] . User's actions is probably absent or non-correlated with the required actions in the case of a face presentation attack. These approaches are usually timeconsuming. They can also make users feel uncomfortable.
Meanwhile, user-transapent approaches do not require user's cooperation. Spontaneous physiological signs of life such as facial visual dynamics [6] , [28] , eye-blinking [29] can be detected and used as liveness cues for face PAD. Some other approaches assumed and exploited the significant difference between a bona-fide face, which is a complex non-rigid 3D object, with a planar object in the case of Print and Replay attacks: the difference in the optical flow field [30] , [31] , the variation of pixel values between images taken in different focuses [32] , [33] . Different types of dynamic texture descriptor such as LDP-TOP [34] , LBP-TOP, LPQ-TOP, BSIF-TOP [35] , LBP-MDCT [36] representing both spatial and temporal dimension have been also proposed for face PAD. Some authors [37] , [38] assumed that the overall motion of the face and the background is highly correlated in the case of presentation attack and inversely in a bone-fide case. However, this assumption is not correct in the case of Replay and Mask attacks. By cutting out tightly the background from a printed photo of a legitimate user, we can also produce a presentation attack that cannot be detected.
2) STATIC APPROACHES
Single image requirement makes these approaches transparent and therefore non-intrusive. These approaches assumed that the inherent disparities between a bona-fide face and a presentation attack one could be observed from a single image. Two approaches have been introduced in literature: Image quality assessment and Texture Analysis.
The mentioned inherent disparities may be interpreted as the difference in the image quality. Different image quality assessments can be used to interprete this difference. Galbally and Marcel [39] proposed to use 14 image quality features extracted from a single image. The performance of this approach is highly dependent on the quality of the acquisition process. Bhogal et al. [40] proposed a set of 6 non-reference image quality measures to distinguish real biometric data from data as used in presentation attacks. Nikisins et al. [41] proposed a system built of different Image Quality Mesures (IQM) forming a feature space, and a Gaussian Mixture Model which is trained to represent the probability distribution of bona-fide sample. Nikisins et al. claimed that their system can detect unseen presentation acttacks.
Texture analysis based approaches assumed that the nature of texture patterns presenting on face bona-fide images and fake ones should be different because of the imperfections and degradations caused by presentation processes. There are many things which can appear to make a presetation attacks' image different from a bona-fide one, such as noise, light reflectance, periodic patterns caused by the halftone process in a printed image or by discretization process in an image displayed on a screen, etc. The authors in [4] , [42] proposed to study these differences in the frequency domain. Some authors proposed to analyze in spatial domain by using a local texture descriptors, such as Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [43] - [45] , Local Graph Structure (LGS) [46] , [47] . Different from the other authors who study only the gray image, [7] proposed to exploit the texture-information in color spaces. These approaches usually employ a non-parametric classification solution such as Support Vector Machines (SVM) to help them classify images. Presentation attacks' images are needed for training the classification system. The classification performance depends therefore significantly on the quality and the size of the training dataset. It may be failed when the trained classifition system is used to predict a presentation attack which does not present in the training database.
Recently, some authors [48] - [51] have tried to exploit the power of deep learning to address the face presentation attack problem. The performance of these modern approachs rely mainly on the computational power, and the quantity as well as the quality of data available to train the neural networks. It would be hard to classify these approaches in the proposed categorization. In this work, we don't have ambition to compare our proposed methode with these computational ones.
The approach introduced in this paper is a development of the work presented in [52] . In this approach, considering that the inherent disparities between a bona-fide and a presentation attack image can be interpreted as the difference in the behavior of noise in the image, it is proposed to develop a statistical noise model which takes into account this difference. The proposed model is then exploited to build a face presentation attack detector with the help of the hypothesis testing framework. The proposed solution required only a single image to process.
Different from most of the related methods in the literature, once the model of bona-fide images is constructed, there is no need to train the detector with presentation attacks' images. The performance of the proposed solution can still be held when a new type of presentation attack is considered.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION A. NOISE LOCAL VARIANCE (NLV) MODEL
Denote z i , i ∈ I the noise value estimated for the i-th pixel of the studied image, here I is the set of indexes of all pixels. It is assumed that z i , i ∈ I are independent. Following the heteroscedastic noise models proposed by Thai et al. [53] , [54] , it is known that the distribution of acquisition noise can be approximated by a zero-mean Gaussian one, where the standard deviation depends on pixel expectation. In this paper, it is proposed to generalize the models by considering the impact of noise caused by textural information, which is assumed to be a zero-mean normal random variable with the standard deviation characterized by σ s . Then, the standard deviation of z i is given by
where µ i is the pixel expectation and f σ (µ) is defined as follows. For a RAW image:
where (a, b) are constant, considered as a fingerprint of the camera. For a TIFF image or JPEG image with high quality factor (QF ≥ 70):
where γ is the gamma correction factor, (ã,b) is the camera fingerprint. (ã,b) differs from the above (a, b) due to demosaicing, white balancing operations, is the quantification step which characterizes the eventual quantification noise. Given image is divided into 8 × 8-pixel blocks. Denote S 2 the sample variance of noise calculated within a block; it is defined as follows:
where i is actually the index of pixel within the block, z represents the average of noise values within the block, defined by:
The following result is obtained, demonstrated in the AppendixVI.
Theorem 1 (Distribution of S 2 ): Within a block, when µ i is sufficiently close to each other, the distribution of S 2 can be appoximated by a Gamma distribution G(α, β), where α is the shape factor, β is the scale factor, (α, β) is signal-dependent and: 
B. NLV MODEL AND THE FACE PAD PROBLEM
A facial image is rich in content, and so the behavior of noise over the whole image is quite heterogeneous. To deal with face presentation attacks by exploiting the NLV model, it is proposed to limit our study in some relevant regions of the image. Textural information intervenes directly on the image content. In a facial image, the skin does not have the same texture as the hair, the clothes and obviously the background. Additionally, it can be noted from the theorem 1, the distribution of S 2 is signal-dependent. The difference in textural information causes the difference in content and then the difference in the behavior of the proposed NLV model. Therefore, it is proposed to focus only on some region which contains specific textural information, which has a significant size and which is persistent overall studied images. For facial images, the interested region should be the skin one. In this work, for the sake of simplicity, it is proposed to employ the method basing on skin color likelihood [55] for the extraction of the skin region in images.
The proposed NLV model is signal-dependent. Image content should be studied to extract correct data for our model. The image content can be obtained by subtracting noise from the natural image. Due to the non-reversibility of noise production, it's impossible to know precisely image noise and so image content. However, the image noise can be estimated thanks to a denoising process. In this paper, the wavelet-based denoising technique described in [56] , which has been successfully exploited in our previous work [53] , is employed. We have also tried the image denoising technique using Wiener filtering. The employed wavelet-based one gave a better results versus the latter. Figure 2 resumes different operations we have to do with a facial image to extract valuable data for our proposed problem.
The image content is divided into 8 × 8 pixels blocks in the same way as we used for the noise image. So each block in noise image has its counterpart at the same location on the image content. Denoteμ i b and v i b respectively the empirical mean and variance of content pixels within the i b -th block, i b ∈ I b and I b is the set of block index. For the sake of simplicity, by omitting the block index, denotẽ µ i , i ∈ {1, 2, .., 64} the estimated content pixel values within a block, we have:μ
It is proposed to eliminate the blocks which do not satisfy the necessary condition of the theorem 1. All the blocks whose content pixel values deviate significantly should be eliminated. The statistic √ v i b is used as an estimate of this deviation. The i b -th block will be eliminated if v i b exceeds some predefined threshold τ b , which can be defined analytically based on the Linderberg's condition [57] . The blocks which stay after the previous elimination operation are considered as homogeneous blocks.
Only homogeneous blocks situated in the skin region are interested to model the noise. These blocks do not have the same content because of the variation of pixel intensity. The distribution of S 2 cannot be compared between these blocks. It is proposed to regroup these blocks into subsets basing on their empirical content meanμ i b so that blocks within a subset have comparable intensity. Semantically, it can be called as a segmentation process. The whole range of image intensity is divided into N s non-overlapping equal intervals. The width of each interval, denoted by s , is derived directly from the value of N s . In fact, for an image which has pixel intensity varying from 0 for absolute black to 1 for absolute white, we have:
All the studied blocks are divided into N s subsets, named as level-sets. Block i b is in the k-th level-set if its empirical content mean,μ i b , drops in the k-th interval defined previously. Denote I l the set of index of all blocks belonging to the lth level-set. Without loss of generality, denote S 2 j , j ∈ I l the NLV of the j-th block. Flowing theorem 1, S 2 j is considered as a sample of a Gamma random variable characterized by (α j , β j ), which depends on the content of j-th block, and we have that:
where the i is the index of pixels within the block. It is noted that S 2 j , j ∈ I l are not identically distributed because of the difference of blocks' content. However, when s is small enough, the difference between blocks' content can be ignored, and it can be assumed that S 2 j , j ∈ I l are identically distributed. They form a population of a random variable following approximately a Gamma distribution. Denote (α l , β l ) the parameters of the latter distribution, l refers to the index of level-set. (α l , β l ) represents all the set of parameters (α j , β j ), j ∈ I l in the equation 9.
For RAW images, we have:
For a specific texture and a segmentation sufficiently narrow, it can be assumed that σ s and 1 64 64 i=1 µ ji are approximately constant. Then, α l β l is constant. In other words, there is a linear relation between α l and β −1 l and this relation is maintained for all images of a typical texture (i.e., real face). For two different textures (i.e., real face and falsified face images), this relation may differ due to the probable difference in σ s and in block content. In fact, high frequency textural information is interpreted as noise, but lower frequency textural information affects directly on the block content.
For TIFF or JPEG images, α j β j can also be represented in function of µ ji and σ s . For a specific texture, we can also deduct approximately a linear relation between α l and β −1 l , which is maintained over all images.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR FACE PAD A. HYPOTHESIS TESTING FORMULATION
In practice, due to the specific color range of skin, there will be level-sets that contain a tiny number of interesting blocks, especially the low or high-range level-sets. So, among the above N s level sets, it is proposed to study the M (M < N s ) level sets in the middle range, which have the most significant number of samples.
Let X l , l ∈ {1, 2, ..M } the populations of noise local variance of the M selected level sets. Let's n l the size of the population l. It is demonstrated in the section III-A that X l follow a Gamma distribution and, for images of a given type of textural noise, there is a linear relation between the shape parameter and the inverse of scale one of this distribution. Then, for any l and a given type of textural noise, we have that:
where α l = a l0 /β l +b l0 , and (a l0 , b l0 ) are constant. In matrix form, we have:
Denote respectively B, θ and A the three terms from left to right of the equation 12. B, a M × 2M matrix and A, a M -length vector, are supposed to be known. Their estimation is proposed in IV-B. The 2M -length vector θ is unknown. VOLUME 7, 2019 We aim to detect falsified image based on the proposed model. Our detection problem is cast in the framework of hypothesis testing. For a face bona-fide image, the model is supposed to satisfy the equation 12. For falsified image, due to the difference in textural noise, the equation 12 would not be satisfied. Consequently, the goal of the test is to decide between two hypothesis defined as follows:
In this paper, we focus on guaranteeing a prescribed false alarm probability. Let
be the class of tests with a false alarm probability upperbounded by α 0 . Here P H j [E] stands for the probability of event E under hypothesis H j , j ∈ {0, 1}. Our proposed statistical test of class K α 0 is given in the section IV-C.
B. ESTIMATION OF LINEAR PARAMETERS
The linear relationship between parameters of Gamma distribution, characterized by the matrix B and the vector A, are estimated from a set of training images, which are all bona-fide images. Each image of the training set is divided into level sets. For each level set, by concatenating the samples of noise variance over all the images of the training set, a bigger sample can be obtained. This sample is then divided randomly into non-overlapping subsamples. For each subsample, the parameters of the gamma distribution which fits the population is estimated by using the Maximizing Likelihood Method. The size of subsamples has to be large enough to assure a reasonable estimation of these parameters. In our implementation, this size is set to be 1000. A linear regression, using Mean Square Error method, is then applied on the set of parameters estimated from the subsamples to obtain (a l0 , b l0 ), where l is the index of the given level set.
C. PROPOSED TEST STATISTIC
Denote the j-th cumulant of the l-th population by κ lj . Different cumulants of the l-th population are given as follows:
We have that:
Let
where x denote the transpose of x. It is easy to see that
Let w = diag(ω, ω, .., ω), the following linear relationship is obtained, η = wθ . Denote the asymptotic covariance matrix of η. It can be defined by = J 2 J 1 VJ 1 J 2 with V , J 1 and J 2 given below:
where, (22) , as shown at the bottom of this page and µ lj is the j-th raw moment of the l-th population. J 1 and J 2 are the Jacobians
where J 1l and J 2l correspond respectively to the following transformations:
The elements of J 1l and J 2l are:
Let h be the sample counterpart of η andˆ be a consistent estimate of . The best estimation of θ should minimize the following quadratic form:
Under no restriction,θ which minimizes the value of Q is given byθ Under H 0 , where θ should satisfy additionally the condition 12, the valueθ that minimizes Q is obtained as follows
Denote Q 0 and Q 1 respectively the minimum values of Q under H 0 and under no restriction (H 1 ). Then
Follow Gurland and Tripathi [58] , the statistic Q H , defined as follows, can be used for testing the null hypothesis H 0 :
It is easy to see that Q 0 ≥ Q 1 . Then, Q H is positive. It follows from the previous equations, it is obtained that:
Gurland and Tripathi [58] have proven that under H 0 , Q H follows asymptotically a chi-square distribution with r = range(B) degrees of freedom (d.f.). When H 0 is not true, the asymptotic distribution of Q H is a non central chi-square random variable with r d.f. and the non-centrality parameter defined by:
Thus, a test of class K α 0 for 13 is to reject H 0 if Q H ≥ χ 2 r,α 0 where χ 2 r,α 0 is the upper α 0 -th percentage point of a chi-square distribution with r d.f.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS A. MODEL VALIDATION
The proposed method was first validated using simulated images. To create simulated images for the experimentation, it is proposed to consider: the simulation of bona-fide face, the simulation of the presentation attack (printing process), and the simulation of the acquisition process. All of the three simulations are very hard to realize. In the experimetation, for the ease of implemenation, these simulations are simplified by omitting several elements.
A. Foi et al.'s piecewise image [59] , denoted I init , given in figure 3a, is considered as equivalent as the role of bona-fide face in our problem. Simulated presentation attack instrument is created by adding simulated printing distortions into I init image. By ignoring geometric distortions, the heteroscedastic noise model proposed in [54] is employed to simulate distortions caused by the acquisition process. Heteroscedastic noise is added into I init and the simulated presentation attack instrument image to create respectively H 0 and H 1 images, Figures 3d and 3e .
The distortions caused by the printing process come from different sources, that can be categorized into two groups: one caused by non-uniformity of printing paper, other caused by the specific characteristics of the printing system (tone and color variation, halftoning process, etc.). These distortions change the statistical behavior of noise in the final image. In this simulation, it is supposed to have an ideal printing system which does not introduce any distortion. Only the nonuniformity of printing paper was taken into account.
A random paper pattern, denoted I patt , given in figure 3f , was employed to create a distorted piecewise image, considered as presentation attack instrument, denoted I dist . The construction of I dist is given as follow:
whereĪ patt is the mean of I patt and is a scale factor. Figures 3b and 3c give examples of distorted piecewise image for = 0.2 and = 0.7 respectively. When = 0.2, the distortion is very small, which is visually hard to detect. The noisy image of this one after passing through the simulation of the acquisition process is given in figure 3e . In our simulation, = 0.2 was opted to create H 1 images.
Thousands of H 0 simulated images were used previously to calibrate the parameters of the proposed model, given by the equation 12. For the validation, totaL 3000 H 0 and 3000 H 1 simulated images are created. The statistic Q H was then computed for M = 10 (N = 100) most important level-sets of each of these 6000 images. Figure 5 gives a comparison between the empirical distributions of Q H under different hypotheses. Theoretical distribution of Q H under H 0 is also given. Theoretical curve match perfectly the empirical one. The discrimination between statistical distribution of the proposed statistic is clear which permit to construct a high performant detector.
B. EXPERIMENTAL DATASET
As mentioned in Section I, there are many public datasets for face presentation attack detection such as Replay-Attack Database [1] , CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [2] , MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database [3] , NUAA Imposter Face Database [4] . However, images or videos from these databases were taken in variable conditions. In general, the quality of image acquisition process is too low. Actually, for images of these databases, textural noise is often negligible before the acquisition noise.
In the proposed method, images have to be captured in the same acquisition conditions, which actually cannot be assured for existing public datasets mentioned above. A new database has been also introduced to validate our proposed approach. The database is constructed by respecting the following conditions:
• Each camera model has their own fingerprint [53] .
Images coming from different camera models cannot be compared in the proposed approach.
• ISO value characterizes the sensitivity of the image sensor. The higher ISO value is, the more sensitive the camera is to light and the more significant the acquisition noise is. When acquisition noise is too important, impacts caused by textural noise become less significant, the performance of the proposed solution decreases. Therefore, it is proposed to keep ISO unchanged between acquisitions and not too high (400 maximum).
• Image-resolution is also an important factor in the proposed approach. When the image resolution is too small, the skin-texture will not be able to modeled correctly. In this work, it is proposed to focus only on high resolution image. In fact, the databased is created by using high sensor-resolution cameras. The distance between camera and imaging objects is also maintained at an adequate distance to capture the whole face with a high quality of focus condition.
In this work, different types of presentation attack were considered:
• Print-Attack: Legitimate user's face is printed on standard A4 paper at 600 dpi using a Olivetti d-Color MF362 Plus photocopier.
• HDPrint-Attack: Legitimate user's face is printed on high quality photo paper using professional photo printing service.
• Projection-Attack: Legitimate user's face is projected on a white board.
• LCD-Attack: Legitimate user's face is displayed on an LCD screen. 6 . Typical scatter plot of gamma distribution parameters estimated from a given level set of different RAW images coming from the S6 dataset; each dot represents the couple (β −1 , α) estimated from the given level set of one image.
Different datasets have been constructed:
• S6: contained RAW and 3000 × 5328 JPEG images captured at ISO 200 by a Samsung Galaxy S6, using application OpenCamera. It contains 179 samples of genuine face, 161 samples of Print-Attack and 158 samples of LCD-Attack.
• Nikon: contained 4000 × 6000 JPEG images captured at ISO 400 by a Nikon D5200 with the option Noise Reduction deactivated. The detail description of this dataset is given in the table 1.
C. RESULTS
For our experimental implementation, it is opted to divide each image into N = 100 level sets. The number of level sets used to construct the statistical test, M , is configured eventually at 5, 10, 15, 20, 25. Beyond the value of 25, experimental results show that a lot of small-size level-sets were taken into account in the construction of the test; that makes its performance decrease.
1) RAW IMAGES
Demosaicing by interpolation was applied into RAW images (by DCRAW) before these were converted into RGB image in TIFF format. The NLV features were computed from one of the three channels of the TIFF image. In this work, it is proposed to choose the green channel, which contains in most of the cases more information than the two other ones due to the configuration of the Color Filter Array (CFA). Figure 6 show a typical scatter plot of gamma distribution parameters, (β −1 , α), estimated from images of the S6 dataset. The discrimination between H 0 and H 1 images is visually clear, as well as, the linear relation between β −1 and α can be confirmed graphically. Figure 7 shows the Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves of the test with different values of M when we try to classify RAW images of the S6 dataset. The BPCER rates obtained for different values of M and for a fixed value of APCER (1%) are given in the table 2.
2) SIMULATED JPEG IMAGES
Simulated JPEG image was developed from a natural RAW image by letting it go through different principal steps of the digital image processing pipeline:
• JPEG Compression (Quality factor 95%) A simulated JPEG image database was constructed from RAW images of the S6 dataset. The performance of the proposed test for this database is given in figure 8 and the table 2. The performance of the test increase with the value of M . The test performed even better than in the case of RAW images. The discrimination between H 0 and H 1 simulated JPEG images may be amplified when the RAW images pass through the mentioned above operations.
3) NATURAL JPEG IMAGES
Eventually, JPEG images, captured by the phone standard camera application, are denoised to obtain a high visual quality (less noise). This denoising operation often happened just after the white balancing and just before the gamma correction operation in the digital image processing pipeline. Each phone's constructor has their private implementation for this denoising. This denoising operation unfortunately destroys the favorable high-frequency information exploited in our proposed method. Consequently, for the classification of JPEG images of the S6 dataset, the proposed approach performed badly.
However, this denoising operation can technically desactivated. For recent Android smartphones, including our Samsung Galaxy S6, by using the Camera2 API, it is possible to build an application which gives us the possibility to configure manually all camera settings and apparently including the implementation of the mentioned denoising operation. For a digital camera, such as Nikon D5200, we have options to deactivate implemented denoising operations. Images from the Nikon dataset were taken with these options deactivated. Figure 9 shows the performance of the proposed test for the classification of these images. Different values of M have been used.
The performance of proposed approach has also been compared with the reference methods proposed in [7] , [39] , [42] , [43] on the Nikon dataset. In our approach, only bonafide images are needed to estimate the parameters of the test. The first set of bona-fide face images is employed for this estimation. For the reference approaches, which are non-parametric classification solutions, presentation attack images are needed to train the SVM models. In the Nikon dataset, attack images were divided into three subsets basing on the type of attack: Print-Attack, HDPrint-Attack, and Projection-Attack. Each subset was divided into two parts, one of these parts would be used to train the SVM models of reference approaches.
The proposed approach was compared with the reference ones in different situations. When all types of face presentation attack are supposed to be known by anti-spoofing systems, reference approaches performed better than ours, as we can see in Fig. 10 .
However, when the systems have to deal with unseen presentation attack instruments (PAI), which is usually the case in practice, reference approaches would classify imprecisely images from a new type of attack, their performance dropped dramatically. Meanwhile, for our solution, which does not require prior knowledge of attack images, [7] . Different performance curves given by [7] approach are labeled with the prefix Zine-. unseen PAI does not bother its performance. Figure 11 shows the performance comparison between our proposed solution and the reference ones under different assumptions about the unseen PAI on different types of face presentation attack.
Widely-used Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is also used in our study as the evaluation parameter to compare the performance of the proposed solution with the reference ones. HTER is half of the sum of the Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and the Bona-fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), evaluated at the threshold τ EER . By definition, τ EER is the threshold which permits to have an Equal Error Rate (EER), which means APCER=BPCER=EER, when the method is evaluated with the training dataset. The Table 3 shows the results obtained for different methods when different configurations of the training dataset is proposed. Our proposed solution performs steadily and, for some configurations of the training dataset, it performs better than the other ones.
Galbally et al.'s solution [39] performs in general better than ours. However, by considering the proposed statistics Q H (Equation 30) as an Image Quality Assesement, it is proposed to add Q H as an additional mesure into the set of 14 mesures proposed in [39] . The presence of Q H as descriptor improves considerably the classification performance, see . Performance of the proposed solution and the reference approaches under different configurations of training dataset. Once a type of attack is mentioned as known, the SVM models of reference approach have been trained with haft of images from this type of attack. DET curves were obtained by evaluating the trained models with images which were not used for training. Our solution is compared with solutions proposed by Galbally et al. [39] , Li et al. [42] , Määttä et al. [43] , Boulkenafet et al. [7] . Different performance curves given by [7] approach are labeled with the prefix Zine-.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we proposed a new way to approach the problem of face presentation attack detection. Textural noise, which behaves differently between images of bona-fide faces and presentation attacks' ones, was taken into account in an existing heteroscedastic noise model. A model of local noise variance was then introduced, which permitted us to construct a statistical test to detect face presentation attacks. Only bonafide images are needed to estimate the parameters of the test.
We introduced also a new database of face presentation attacks to validate our solution. When a lack of knowledge of some types of attack is considered, our proposed solution performed better than some existing solutions mentioned in the reference. The statistic introduced in the proposed solution permits also improve the performance of an existing face PAD solution.
Exploiting the proposed NLV model for the PAD problem has some limitations. The proposed model is based on the behavior of the image noise, which is in reality significantly impacted by several factors, such as the heterogeneity of image content, the image acquisition conditions, and many others. Different contraints have been taken in consideration to minimize these impacts. These contraints allow to obtain a better model of the noise, which has been employed in the construction of our statistical tests for the PAD problem. However, these contraints limit as well the application field of the approach. The proposed contraints are based mainly on our observational studies. The complexity of etablishing an analytical study for these contraints is also a limitation of this work. Our future researches focus on bypassing these limitations.
APPENDIX NLV MODEL DEMONSTRATION
This is a demonstration for the theorem 1. It is proposed to check the section III-A for the description of the problem and of different mathemathic symbols employed in the following paragraphs.
We have that z i is independent zero-mean and Var(z i ) = f σ (µ i ). When µ i is sufficient close to each other, Var(z i ) is close enough to each other and Lindeberg's condition is satisfied. By invoking the Linderberg Central Limit Theorem, we have that:
where
It follows thatz 2 i is a chi-square random variable with one d.f. Let denote, for all i, a random variable Y i , defined as follows:
Denote M X (t) the Moment Generating Function of the random variable X . We have that:
By comparing the MGF, it follows that:
We have that S 2 = 63 i=0 Y i , is the sum of the correlated gamma random variable Y i , i ∈ {0, , 1, .., 63}. It follows from [60] that the MGF of S 2 can be expressed as:
where det(.) denotes the determinant operator, I 64 is the 64 × 64 identity matrix, D is the 64 × 64 diagonal matrix with the entries β i and C is the covariance matrix defined by: 
with ρ i,j is the correlation coefficient between Y i and Y j within a block, i.e.,
Denoting {λ i } 63 i=0 the eigenvalues of the matrix DC, we can rewrite the equation (41) as follow:
The precise probability distribution of S 2 is given in, but it is so complicated mathematically. In this paper, we try to approximate it by a gamma distribution G(α, β), which is much simpler to analyze. This approximation can be realized by using the moment matching method, which gives us that:
The λ i values depend on the β i and then depend on the block content. It follows that (α, β) is signal-dependent and:
It's easy to show that the trace of a symmetric matrix is the sum of its eigenvalues. So that,
Then, it follows from the equations (35) (40), (46) and (47) that:
